

# ANALYSING TAIWAN'S INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE REVITALISATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUDIES APPROACH

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## **Abstract**

*This paper seeks to investigate how shifting political ideology impacts government decision-making relating to language revitalisation. It draws on an existing analytical methodology developed by van Leeuwen, namely 'the grammar of purpose' within a critical discourse studies (CDS) approach. I compared the findings from the analysis of two language revitalisation policies. The findings illustrate how the government's intention is manifested in the purposeful clauses of their statements. In doing so, this paper draws out the diverging ideologies of different political parties when it comes to revitalising Indigenous languages in Taiwan and explains their implications.*

*Keywords:* critical discourse studies, policy analysis, Indigenous language revitalisation, Taiwan, language policy

## **Introduction**

The project that informed this paper is situated in the context of Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation (Ting, 2021). This paper reports on the findings of the analysis of two language policy documents aiming to show the underlying ideology of the policy documents and to provide insight into how political ideology influenced decision-making about language matters. The two Indigenous language revitalisation plans used in the analysis provide a unique opportunity to study language ideology within changing political ideologies because the two plans were stipulated under two oppositional political administrations. This study observes the linguistic differences between the policies of two political parties and the opportunity provided for analysis to illuminate the overarching ideologies of these two parties. Considering this political context, this study investigates how the shifting political ideology impacted government decision-making relating to language revitalisation. Therefore, the research question asks 'What is the policy discourse about Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan?' This paper deploys a Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) methodology with linguistic tools for textual analysis. CDS believes language is used to influence people's beliefs and attitudes because

language creates social meaning. As Bell (2013, p.32) wrote “language is a social practice, a range of resources on which speakers draw”. The social aspects of language mean that by analysing the language used, social and political issues and their underlying causes could surface.

Below, I first introduce the socio-political background of Taiwan and its Indigenous language revitalisation efforts. I then explain the methodology choice and tools used for the analysis. The paper has a double analytical focus on the Chinese character ‘rang’ (the ‘make-become structure’, and the ‘allow structure’). The rationale for this set of foci is provided in the method section. In the findings section, I demonstrate how linguistic devices are used to uncover the ideologies of different Government administrations within the language revitalisation policy documents. This paper ends with a discussion on the implication for Taiwan’s Indigenous language revitalisation.

### **Taiwan’s linguistic and socio-political background**

To provide the context of this paper, I first explain Taiwan’s political and linguistic background. Taiwan is a Pacific Island situated next to the Chinese Mainland – the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C). The official name of Taiwan as an independent nation is the Republic of China (R.O.C), which is not recognised by China or by many other countries. In 1992, the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. representatives held a meeting on the basis of a vaguely defined One-China Principle (一個中國原則), in what the Chinese government refers to as the “1992 Consensus” (九二共識) (Dupré, 2017, p. 42). The One-China Principle is not just a recognition of political powers, but also has a strong linguistic reference to Mandarin Chinese, especially the idea of “Mandarin as common unifying language across the Strait” (Dupré, 2017, p. 121), putting Mandarin Chinese at the top of the linguistic hierarchy. The One-China ideology is not just a theoretical principle, it is a reality for the people of Taiwan and influences policy decisions. Thus, the word ‘China’ is controversial.

Taiwan has a relatively small percentage of Indigenous people, in comparison to Māori in New Zealand or Hawaiian in the State of Hawaii. Around 2% (approx. 469,000) of Taiwan’s population are Indigenous people, consisting of 16 officially recognized Indigenous nationalities (Li, 2008; Tang, 2011) speaking 16 unique languages. Their languages are termed ‘Formosan languages’ and are the most diverse within the entire Austronesian language family. As a result of the diversity, these tribal languages are mutually unintelligible on the island, despite geographic proximity. The diversity strongly suggests that Taiwan’s Indigenous languages are the homeland of Austronesian languages (Li, 2008). Unfortunately, these languages are in various states of endangerment. In the 90s, efforts were made for Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan, starting with the

establishment of the Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP) in 1996 and several policies have followed since. These include the two Indigenous language revitalisation plans used for this paper discussed further below.

Taiwan has long colonisation and immigration history dating back to the 14<sup>th</sup> century and has been occupied by the Dutch, Spanish, Japanese and the Chinese-Nationalist Party. While Dutch and Spanish had colonies in Taiwan, their activities were mostly restricted to trades (Sandel, 2003; Tang, 2011). Since the late Ming Dynasty (in the 17<sup>th</sup> century), a large number of Mainland Chinese from the coastal regions migrated to Taiwan. These early Chinese migrants constitute the 'Taiwanese languages' speaking population in Taiwan (Haklo-Taiwanese 73% and Hakka 12%) (Tang, 2011), which is the majority of the population.

In 1949 the Mandarin Chinese-speaking Chinese-Nationalist Party Kuomintang (KMT hereafter) was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil war and retreated to Taiwan. This event separated the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. The KMT brought with them the 13% Mandarin Chinese-speaking population that held onto power for four decades (Sandel, 2003; Tang, 2011), which created the elite perception of Mandarin Chinese as the de facto national language.

After retreating to Taiwan, the KMT's top priority was to secure its power against Communist China. Consequently, the 'Mandarin-only' approach was a means to ensure the nation was united by 'one language, one government', and the Martial Law, which lasted four decades, was put in place to strengthen the nationalist ideology. Sandel (2003) explains:

The KMT justified their actions by claiming they were necessary for the war to recover the mainland from the Communist bandits; and it was necessary that Taiwan's population learn to speak the national language, Mandarin, so that it would be prepared to rule on the day it 'recovered' the mainland. (p. 529)

Under Martial Law, all non-Mandarin Chinese languages were banned and this has left the Indigenous languages in a desperate state, more so than Haklo-Taiwanese and Hakka. Such devastation of the Indigenous languages resulted in a UNESCO report warning that the absence of 'child speakers' is an alarming indication of the future prospects for the languages (Bradley, 2010) due to the lack of intergenerational transmission of language (Fishman, 1991).


Since the abolishment of the Martial Law in the late 80s, the biggest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP hereafter), was established with a pro-Taiwan independence stance, supported mainly by the Haklo-Taiwanese

speakers. However, it was not until 1996 that Taiwan had its first democratically elected president, Lee Teng-hui. This marked the true beginning of Taiwan's democracy. Lee's presidency constituted an unparalleled step towards the 'Taiwanisation' and the 'democratisation' of Taiwan (Dupré, 2017).

After nearly 50 years of oppression by the Mandarin-dominated KMT, the DPP rose to power as a minority government in the 2000 presidential election, under the leadership of Chen Shui-bian. Since the 2000 election, DPP has been in power twice (4 terms in total) and has had a 'Taiwanisation' focus in its policy approach (Dupré, 2017). This was also an opportunity for them to influence Taiwan's linguistic repertoire. The KMT versus DPP era presents an interesting opportunity for the analysis of the policy ideology surrounding Indigenous language revitalisation and how Indigenous language revitalisation has been recontextualised by two ideologically distinct political powers to suit their agenda. Below, I explain the complexity of the policy background.

When the DPP first rose to power in 2000 for two terms in government (2000-2008), the first language policy solely dedicated to Indigenous language revitalisation was drafted – The Stage 1, Six-Year Indigenous Language Revitalisation Plan (2008-2013), but later executed under the KMT President Ma Yingjiu when KMT returned to power in 2008. The Stage 2 Plan (2014-2019) was amended under the KMT Government during Ma's two terms of presidency (eight years), but its implementation continued under the DPP Government. Figure 1 below shows the overlapping period of the policy and the changing political powers.

**Figure 1. Political powers and policy timeframe**



Considering this political context, this study seeks to investigate how the shifting political ideology impacted government decision-making relating to language revitalisation, and how language revitalisation is recontextualized by different political parties to support the construction of a nation-building discourse that is inclusive of Indigenous languages.

## Methodology

The complexity of the political ideology requires a methodological approach to analysis that can handle such complexity, namely critical discourse studies (CDS). CDS was formerly known as critical discourse analysis (CDA). In recognising that being critical is not just an analysis, it is an attitude to problem-solving, Wodak and Meyer (2016) suggested that CDS be the preferred term. CDS has several key assumptions and concepts that are fitting for this study (Wodak & Meyer, 2016; Unger, 2013). Firstly, CDS's insistence on taking into account the broader socio-political and historical contexts makes it well suited to recognise Taiwan's colonisation history and linguistic repertoire. Secondly, CDS explores the relationship between power and ideology, which is the objective of this study. Ideology is defined as an 'up-side-down' worldview (Wodak & Meyer, 2016) and is used to sustain power. Therefore, scrutinising ideology is a key task for this critical approach.

In this study, I use the phrase 'language ideology' to mean socially, culturally and politically loaded positions of and about a language (Woolard, 1998). That is to say, socio-politically constructed ideology influences language policy. As Lo Bianco (2009, p.116) pointed out, the nature of policy texts is that they are "persuasive in intent". Grin (2003) further indicated that policy documents represent, mostly, the dominant ideology of the government. Therefore, government plans can be seen as a way to legitimise the government's ideology and its intentions. The propensity of CDS in scrutinising power imbalance makes it well-suited to the identification of policy ideology and government intention.

Thirdly, it is understood by CDS scholars that ideology is manifested in the language we use (Fairclough, 1989). This suggests that the linguistic mechanisms used by the text producer shape the meanings and thus the underlying ideology of a text; consequently, text analysts can recover these ideological positions by scrutinizing the way the language is utilized within a discourse. Accordingly, this study contains a systemic linguistic analysis of texts, which is another key feature of CDS. Finally, in accordance with CDS's focus on an interdisciplinary approach, this study is situated at the crossroads of Indigenous language revitalisation, language policy and CDS.

Another useful concept within the CDS approach is 'intertextuality'. This concept is key to the understanding of this paper and is particularly relevant to policy analysis as this concept is used to sustain ideology. Intertextuality allows for the recognition that the same message can be produced in different texts, sometimes in different forms/formats (e.g., policy documents or pamphlets or speeches), forming an intertextual chain (Fairclough, 1992) that links manifestations of a certain ideology. The intertextual chain serves another purpose –

recontextualisation. The notion of recontextualisation simply means the meaning of an event may be interpreted differently when it is put in a different context (Fairclough, 1992). At the end of the recontextualisation chain, the meaning of the original text may be ‘lost in translation’, yet new meaning emerges. In this process, meanings transform, distort and become recontextualised to create cohesion and consistency, and to serve the purpose of the discourse creator.

## Method

The texts used for the analysis are Taiwan’s two stages of six-year language revitalisation plans. Later, I refer to them as S1 and S2.

1. Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation Stage 1, 2008-2013 [原住民族語言振興六年計畫 (2008-2013)];
2. Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation Stage 2, 2014-2019 [原住民族語言振興第2期六年計畫 (2014-2019)].

These were the first government plans solely dedicated to Indigenous language revitalisation, signalling a change in the official top-down approach to the Indigenous languages. Thus, they mark a significant milestone in the campaign for Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan. As I have explained earlier, these two texts offer a unique opportunity to observe language ideology within shifting political ideology and show how indigenous language revitalisation is recontextualised.

The analytical tool I elected to examine the government’s policy ideology is the discursive *construction of purpose* (or grammar of purpose) (van Leeuwen, 2008) in which the analytical attention is given to the linguistic feature of clause construction in documents that the government uses to legitimise its action. It further unpacks the government’s intent, showing “how the purposes of social practices are constructed, interpreted, and negotiated” (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 124).

For a text to be purposeful, three elements are needed: 1) purposeful action(s), 2) a purposeful link, and 3) a purposeful statement. In this prototypical structure ‘do X in order to achieve Y’, ‘do X’ is the purposeful action, ‘in order to’ is the purposeful link, and ‘achieve Y’ is the purposeful statement and, hence, the purpose. ‘Achieve Y’, in this case, is also viewed as the ‘intention’ of the speaker. In the following example given by van Leeuwen (2008) ‘mothers take their tots to the clinic to check their health’, ‘take their tots to the clinic’ is the purposeful action, and ‘to check their health’ is the purposeful statement. In this sense, the purpose is the outcome of an action. When the purposeful link is implicit, the purposeful link ‘in order to’ can be inserted. The active agent here is ‘the mothers’.

The purposeful clause could also be seen as a modalised clause as it shows the intention and preference of the speaker. As Coulthard et al. (2016) explain, a government policy is also the legal intention of the government. Thus, the purposeful clauses in the policy are taken as the ideology of the government. The analysis of the construction of purpose identifies the purpose of the policies to show 'who did what to whom and for what purpose'.

No English version was released for the two Six-Year Plans at the time when the study took place. Therefore, in analysing these Chinese policies, the character 'rang' (讓) was identified as the purposeful link as it demonstrates the will of the speaker and the cause-effect relation (Wang, 2011). In other words, the Chinese character 'rang' (讓) has causative qualities (Wang, 2011) which also indicate *preference* as it shows the "determination and the desire to control" from the speaker (Wang, 2011, p. 96). It, therefore, functions as a modal of preference. For this reason, it is used as the intention marker, and the clause following 'rang' is considered the purposeful clause containing the purposeful statement.

'Rang' can be translated to 'make-become' and 'allow'. The use of 'make-become' is viewed as a relational process. In light of this, a transitivity analysis (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014) has been adopted to analyse this structure. When it is translated as 'allow', the structure contains the modal of preference 'would like'. The analysis of 'rang' is further explained in the next section.

## Findings

What does the policy really say about Indigenous language revitalisation? With 'language revitalisation' in mind as the intention of the policy, I present findings to show how intention and purpose can be constructed linguistically. The linguistic feature used to explore the texts is the Chinese character 'rang' (讓). The following sections present two analytical structures of 'rang'.

### The 'make-become' structure

*Rang* is translated as 'make-become' when followed by *cheng-wei* (成為), which means become. The meaning of 'make *X* become *Y*' shows that, to a certain degree, the speaker 'would like' *X* to turn into *Y*; it, therefore, indicates preference. For this reason, *rang* is treated as a modal of preference, the speaker's desire, in this case, the government's intention. In this 'make-become' structure, an active agent is doing certain things to the subject in anticipation of a certain effect, via the material transitivity process 'make-become'. Transitivity analysis of the material process is adopted for the analysis of this structure. The material process is about actions and contains Agent, Affected, and Beneficiary.

For example, in English ‘my mother made me (become) a better person’, ‘me’ is the Beneficiary and ‘a better person’ is the Affected with ‘my mother’ being the active Agent. In the make-become structure with ‘rang’ as the intention marker, it would be presented as ‘my mother + *rang* + me + *cheng-wei* + a better person’. Following ‘rang’ is the purposeful clause; therefore, ‘become a better person’ is the purpose of this statement, the outcome. In the English translation, ‘rang’ is replaced by ‘make’. In Table 1, I present data from the texts, and compare the use of the make-become structure in S1 and S2, identifying the different purposes within the policy documents.

**Table 1. The make-become structure in S1 and S2**

S1 (2008–2013)	S2 (2014–2019)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the written and spoken Taiwanese Austronesian languages [...] + rang + <b>Indigenous language</b> [...] + become the research headquarters for Austronesian languages.</li> <li>• making Taiwan the research headquarters + rang + promotion of <b>Taiwan’s Indigenous languages</b> + become the role model for Austronesian language development.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the promotion of written and spoken Indigenous languages + rang + <b>Taiwan</b> + become the research headquarters for Austronesian languages.</li> <li>• in the process of democracy ... + rang + <b>respect for other cultures</b> + become the bases for democracy.</li> <li>• promotion of orthography + rang + <b>Indigenous languages</b> + become the medium for reading and acquiring knowledge</li> </ul>

Two statements in S1 used the make-become structure, and three in S2 were identified. As shown in Table 1, the findings indicate that this structure always takes a ‘nominalised action or process’ in the place of the active agent, for example, ‘the written and spoken Taiwanese Austronesian languages’ in S1 and ‘the promotion of written and spoken Indigenous languages’ in S2. This shows that the ‘make-become’ structure does not have human agency as an *active agent*. Such structure implies that there is no named social agent and thus *no one* takes responsibility for the actions. The lack of active human agents signals no specific government agency is constructed as responsible for Indigenous language revitalisation.

The analysis also suggests that both plans intend to differentiate Taiwan from China by lexical choices, such as ‘Taiwan’ and ‘democracy’, following ‘rang’. ‘Taiwan’ and ‘democracy’ in this sense could be seen as synonyms of each other. The use of ‘Taiwan’ instead of the official name Republic of China strongly suggests that the word ‘China’ is contentious within the language policy given the resistance to the controversial One-China principle. It seems, both



government administrations are using this opportunity to reiterate that Taiwan is a democratic nation. Furthermore, due to the association with Mandarin Chinese and historical linguistic oppression, it is understandable why the Indigenous language revitalisation plans choose to use 'Taiwan' instead.

Likewise, both plans appear to show an intention to elevate Taiwan's international reputation, for example, both plans advocate for Taiwan to 'become the research headquarters for Austronesian languages'. Since Taiwan's Formosan languages are considered to be the origin of Austronesian languages, it appears that the policies are using this opportunity to further Taiwan's research connections with other countries. Interestingly, S2 stated that it would make 'respect for other cultures become the bases for democracy'. Here, the purposeful statement 'become the bases for democracy' indicates Taiwan's intention to strengthen its democracy or democratic process, and subsequently builds the nation as inclusive of Indigenous people, constructing a national identity that is multi-cultural. This further indicates that the KMT's S2 intends to establish Taiwan's reputation via the inclusion of the Indigenous languages and overturn its previously undemocratic and oppressive practice under Martial law. Nevertheless, both S1 and S2 appear to use indigenous languages to elevate Taiwan's indigenous research capability.

However, there is a difference in the structure between the two plans that is revealed through the difference in *Beneficiary* within the make-become structure. In S2 the Beneficiaries are not always the language, whereas in the S1 the Beneficiary is always the language (see the bold font in Table 1). This means that, in S1, the 'language' is always the one that benefits from the action, whereas S2 contains two other agendas in addition to language issues. That is to say, in S2, 'Taiwan' and 'respect for other cultures' are also the beneficiaries of the action. In this case, 'the other cultures' seem to be directed at the Indigenous people.

From the data, the DPP's S1 seems to offer a more inclusive ideology towards Indigenous languages because their language (Haklo-Taiwanese) was in the same position as the Indigenous languages. Therefore, S1 appears to put Indigenous language at the heart of Taiwan's multilingual repertoire as demonstrated in the analysis of the make-become structure where the *language* is always the Beneficiary in S1. The strong appreciation of 'local language' underscores the DPP's attempt towards 'Taiwanisation' and to create a unique Taiwanese flavour, and perhaps a national identity that is rooted in a multilingual repertoire. Whereas S2 implemented by the KMT seems to retain some of its traditional stance where strengthening democracy and demarcation from China are the party's historical position. Regardless of this difference, both policies seem to be signalling a nation-building discourse, each inserting their view on Taiwan's political position. Next, I look at the 'allow structure'.

### The ‘Allow’ structure

*Rang* is translated as ‘allow’ when “agent 1 concedes to the will of agent 2” (Wang, 2011, p.70), without the explicit ‘cheng-wei’ (成為). Similar to ‘make-become’, ‘to allow *X* to do *Y*’ implies that the speaker ‘would like’ *X* to be (more like) *Y*, which demonstrates the rationality of the speaker’s desire to pursue the selected action. In the context of the Six-Year Plans, ‘allow’ is not used as a transitive verb, as in ‘to permit’; rather, it is used as an intransitive verb, as in ‘to allow *for*’, which carries the meaning of “give consideration to a circumstance” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Taking into account the genre and the context, the *allow structure* highlights the position of the ‘passive agent’ and the future circumstances that are intentionally applied to the agent, as shown below.

#### **Active Agent + rang (讓)+ passive agent+ future circumstances/*purposeful statement***

This structure demonstrates how uneven power is exercised between social actors. An English example would be ‘the computer programme allows the children to do the activities from home’. In this structure ‘the children’ are the ‘passive agents’, and ‘do the activities from home’ is the purposeful statement. An example from the data in S1 (in plain English) is ‘For Taiwan to stand on its two feet, we must allow our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first’. Here, ‘our indigenous friends’ is the passive agent and ‘stand on their two feet’ is the purposeful statement and the future circumstance. Table 2 below shows the allow structure recognised from the texts. In the analysis, there are 15 examples of the ‘allow’ structure in S2, and only 3 in S1. The reason for this could be that S1 is a prototype plan for language revitalisation, the first regulation solely aimed at Indigenous language revitalisation. This could be seen as the DPP’s lack of experience in Indigenous language revitalisation, a trial-and-error process. This could also be interpreted as the KMT trying to out-do the DPP in its policy writing and showing solidarity with the Indigenous communities considering the nature of the political rivalry.

The analysis reveals that, in S1, Indigenous people are always positioned as the *passive agent* in the clauses following ‘rang’ (our indigenous friends, indigenous people outside tribal areas). Similarly, the examples in S2 place Indigenous people (e.g. infant, children, adults, learners, indigenous people, student teachers) in the same passive position. Since text repetition builds the cohesion of the discourse (Locke, 2004), this could have a serious impact by implying a *disability discourse* (McCarty, 2013) which portrays the Indigenous community as incapable and, thus, jeopardises the speakers’ self-perception and consequently the language revitalisation work.

**Table 2. The allow structure in S1 and S2**

S1 (2008 - 2013)	S2 (2014 - 2019)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Taiwan to stand on its two feet +rang +our Indigenous friends + stand on their two feet first</li> <li>• Taiwan to step out +rang + our Indigenous friends + to step out first</li> <li>• Create camps + rang + Indigenous people living outside the tribal areas + establish a sense of belonging.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish language learning environment for infant + rang + infants + acquired language skills.</li> <li>• Democracy and multicultural understanding helps with language protection policies +rang+ Indigenous language + more accessible.</li> <li>• Strengthen infant immersion school + rang + infant, children and adults + has appropriate channels for learning Indigenous languages</li> <li>• Digital platform + rang + different learners + easy access to learning materials</li> <li>• Language nannies are required to use the mother tongue + rang + infants + language immersion and language learning</li> <li>• Create camps + rang + Indigenous people living in outside the tribes + establish a sense of belonging.</li> <li>• Strengthen church's function on language preservation + rang+ Indigenous people + learn the language at church</li> <li>• Establish open teaching resource platform + rang +people interested in compiling teaching material + exchange information, compile and edit materials</li> <li>• Establish multimedia platform + rang + more people + learn Indigenous languages</li> <li>• Language skills certification +rang + people that gained the certification + offer training so they can teach the languages</li> <li>• Teacher development classes + rang + student teachers + strengthen knowledge in language teaching</li> <li>• Change attitude + rang + Indigenous people + engage in the operation of this Plan</li> <li>• Strengthen language preservation and transmission +rang + language + continue development (of language )</li> <li>• Promote and establish learning channels + rang + learners of different ability + easy to learn</li> <li>• promote language skills certification + rang + tests + convenient (accessible)</li> </ul>

Furthermore, the analysis of S2 shows 14 out of the 15 examples have language revitalisation activities as the purpose (following ‘rang’), which is fitting for the aim of the plan. In contrast, in S1, none of the examples following ‘rang’ contains language revitalisation activities. Instead, S1’s purposeful clause contains the phrases ‘step out’ and ‘stand on one’s two feet’. The significance of these phrases is that they could be seen as synonyms to Taiwan’s independence from China as the DPP has a strong Taiwan-independence stance. The different focus in the purposeful statement in the two plans further highlights the differences in political ideology and language ideology. That is not to say that S1 does not have language revitalisation in mind, as both plans aim at language revitalisation. Rather, language revitalisation serves other political purposes.

## Discussion

The language structures in the policy documents seem to be signalling a nation-building discourse by their word-choices following the intention marker ‘rang’, which suggest the policies intend to establish Taiwan as ‘not China’. This finding provides an interesting view of national identity in Taiwan. The language ideology manifested in the policy shows that a ‘one nation one language’ ideology is no longer a fitting approach for Taiwan. Contrary to Hall’s (1996) claim that the reinforcement of a nation creates a homogeneous culture, the inclusive approach of Taiwan’s Indigenous language policy shows encouragement for diversity. However, this could be seen as lip service due to the fact that in the analysis of the verb ‘rang’ *no one* is constructed as the responsible social agent for language revitalisation. There seems to be no action to back it up, no accountability. While these documents aim to promote the use of Indigenous language, there exists a considerable number of institutional obstacles due to the political ideology involved.

Despite the political undercurrent in present-day Taiwan regarding the KMT - DPP opposition, we can see that the analysis showed that a coherent Taiwanese identity was reiterated through the progress in Indigenous language revitalisation. That is, both the KMT and the DPP share the view that Indigenous Taiwanese are part of Taiwan. It is indicated that, to be ‘Taiwan’, we must embrace the Indigenous languages that are unique to the island, which is empowering to the Indigenous community. This asserts Taiwan’s self-governing quality as a multicultural nation, which brands Taiwan as tolerant, open and able to keep up with the West in its democratic operation (as opposed to Mainland China’s intolerance of minorities). The new Taiwanese identity needs its “original people” (Hall, 1996, p. 615), and therefore the inclusion of Taiwan’s Indigenous communities gives rise to the authenticity of this national identity. As such, both parties have the same motivation when it comes to using Indigenous language revitalisation to enhance Taiwan’s international reputation and assert their

versions of *Taiwanese identity*. Thus, the nation-building discourse could be seen as a branding strategy to portray the government as supportive, to create a positive image about Taiwan's Government (for both the KMT and the DPP). Taking into consideration many of Taiwan's current efforts in transitional justice and reconciliation with local communities, this also serves the government's intention to reconcile its colonial history, where the past negative influence of colonisation is ignored, and a positive counter-narrative of a prosperous multilingual Taiwan is established as the *new normal*. Within this new narrative, the government is constructed as obliged to carry out language revitalisation.

Now, the big task is to see how the KMT can negotiate its pro-Chinese ideology within the growing Taiwanese-identifying generation and how the DPP assert its de-Sinicisation ideology through the Indigenous language revitalisation plans. However, without directly confronting the One-China ideology, the Mandarin Chinese language dominant ideology remains unchallenged. As a result, how the growing Taiwanese-identified population can resist the ideology about Mandarin Chinese is also going to be a challenge to the government as it would have a significant impact on how effectively Indigenous language revitalisation is carried out.

## Conclusion

The linguistic analysis of this paper draws out the underlying ideology of Taiwan's language policies. The findings provide insights into how language revitalisation was recontextualised by the two opposing governments to meet their political agendas and to maintain the social order. Noticeably, both plans show a desire to differentiate Taiwan from Mainland China. In light of this finding, I suggest the two texts exemplify a discourse on nation-building, with each political party embedding its political ideology in the policy to assert their version of Taiwan's national identity, subtly, using language revitalisation as camouflage. Also, the differences in their approach to nationalism underline the two parties' different levels of acceptance of the controversial One-China ideology. The combination of these agendas raises intriguing questions regarding the nature of the policy ideology. While these policies are aimed at preserving and revitalisation of the Indigenous language, it seems they are being subtly used as political tools.

Overall, this paper contributes to the application of CDS in Chinese language policy. For the studies on Indigenous language revitalisation, this paper offers additional resources and an alternative theoretical contribution that demonstrates a new way to contest and challenge the dominant ideology and provides insights to the struggle of language revitalisation efforts. While the focus of this study is based on Taiwan's language policy, the framework and methods used within this

paper could be widely applied to countries with Indigenous language revitalisation interests.

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